What History Gets Wrong — And Right — About Andrew Johnson
Part 3: What Historians Forget About the Roles of Johnson And Robert E. Lee In Ending The Civil War
Note: For much of the material in this section, the author is grateful to the work of Jay Winik author of April 1865 and a section in What Ifs of American History.
The biggest burden that Andrew Johnson has borne by history was that he was almost singlehandedly responsible for squandering the possibilities in the post-Civil War world. That he utterly destroyed the plans for Reconstruction and that his willingness to accept the South back so quickly and with so few restrictions led, to within a decade of the end of the war, to the rise of Jim Crow in the South and any chance for civil rights and opportunities for African-Americans for nearly a century.
In the next article in this series I intend to go into the fallacies both in that argument as well as the inevitable problems Lincoln would have faced had he not been assassinated, but what I want to deal with in this article is a fact so obvious that most historians tend to leave it out of any story of the Civil War. And indeed, it is for that reason that two of the most controversial figures in American history have never gotten credit for what happened in April of 1865.
Like most of you I assumed that the end of the Civil War occurred on April 9th 1865 when Robert E. Lee surrendered to Ulysses Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. That date is so fixed in the average history book that, even after years of demythologizing both the war and why it was thought, we still make that assumption. Indeed, that was far from the truth — and even the idea of the surrender was never carved in stone.
Lee was the Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and by 1865, commander of all the Confederate Armies. By April 2nd the siege of Richmond had been broken and Lee had abandoned the capital. But even when Grant broke through, he didn’t believe that meant the end of hostilities. On April 8th Lee managed to elude the Union Army, and on that day he seemed determined to fight to the death.
On the morning of April 9th Lee did intend to fight, but his cavalry learned quickly there were two solid miles of Union infantry. He summoned his generals, trying to figure out to fight or surrender. E. P. Alexander suggested an option that was favored by many — including Jefferson Davis, running for his life, still favored.
Simply, the army would scatter and assume guerilla warfare. As America would learn all too late in Vietnam, this kind of warfare can be enough to break a military. There had already been countless examples of this by the 1860’s and Lee’s own father had used it against the British during the Revolutionary War.
The Confederacy had some of the greatest guerilla fighters in history on its side; Nathan Bedford Forrest, William Quantrill; John Mosby and several brothers from Missouri led by Frank James. The Confederacy knew the countryside intimately, and it was more than suited for it: long mountain ranges, endless swamps and dark forests. In order for the Union to win, they would have to occupy the entire Confederacy. That meant federal forces would have to subdue, patrol and police an area as large as France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Poland combined.
And in this conflict, these forces would have no real rest, or respite, or any true sense of victory. With no sense of closure, eventually the Nation already exhausted from the conflict, would demand to sue for peace. The Union had already learned the hard way how horrid guerilla warfare was in Missouri where the carnage had been so great, even some Confederate generals had been appalled by it.
Robert E. Lee has been canonized in the South as a misunderstood hero, which is incredibly wrong. But history never credits him for defying Davis and his generals and deciding not to take this option. “It would set brother against brother as killers and marauders and the effect on the country would be too great.” It’s also worth noting that when Lee did surrender, it did not mitigate the feelings of vengeance in the North. The day that Lee surrender an article in the Chicago Tribune recommend he be hung.
But this gesture did not mean the end of all hostilities, something all — including Lincoln knew. Florida and Texas were still in complete control of the Confederacy. Over 175,000 men were determined to fight to the death, and Davis and his government were running deeper into the South. Even Lee’s wife said as much: “The end is not yet. Richmond is not the Confederacy. General Lee is not the Confederacy.” In the 1860s, it could take weeks, perhaps months before the news reached all the soldiers still fighting. Anything could happen to destroy the mood for tranquility. Five days later, something did.
After Lincoln’s assassination, the North was paralyzed with fear. In America’s young history, a President had never been assassinated before, certainly not with a war underway. As I mentioned, two Presidents had died in office within the past twenty years but the method for Presidential succession had never been tested in this way. And that was before you considered Johnson was also a Southern Democrat — essentially the enemy.
There was genuine terror about the repercussions. Would the South take advantage of the chaos and resort to guerilla warfare? Would the Cabinet, who had no use for Johnson before his drunken performance at the Inauguration and were, after all, not members of his party, allow him to take the oath of office? Some thought the cabinet might attempt a regency government, and some feared for a military coup.
And even when Johnson was sworn in, there were calls for blood and vengeance throughout the north. Lincoln had never been immensely popular during this Presidency (and as we shall see in the next article, there was more than genuine reason for that animosity from both parties) but John Wilkes Booth had turned him into a martyr. Lincoln might have called for magnanimity and the spirit of Appomattox but large portions of the country did not feel that way at the time — and after all, the man had been murdered by those same people he had wanted mercy for.
It is very possible that had another Republican taken the oath — such as Hannibal Hamlin, Lincoln’s first Vice President — that very well might have happened regardless. Lincoln had always managed to balance the Radical branch of his party who conflicted with every aspect of how he waged the war and certainly did not share his views on the peace. (I will deal with some of the most specific individuals in the next article because they are, in fact, critical to why Johnson was impeached.) Indeed a critical factor may have the way that Congress worked in the 19th century. Congress had been sworn in along with Lincoln and Johnson but would not return for its first session until December of that year. Had a Congress completely controlled by the Republicans been in DC at the time, Johnson might not have been able to withstand the calls for vengeance and indeed another Republican themselves would have been more inclined not to even hesitate.
Even if this had not been the case, Johnson would have been within his right to call for vengeance upon the South. His immediate superior had been assassinated; he had barely escaped death that same night twice. Robert E. Lee was back in Richmond. Johnson could have given into the mood of the papers and ordered Lee and his fellow generals executed without a second thought. The consequences might well have disastrous, but no one in the Cabinet or the North would have blinked twice.
But Johnson chose not to do so. His first act was for a day of national mourning. Then he presided with dignity over Lincoln’s funeral ceremony in D.C before his predecessor’s body was sent home to Springfield. Not long after, General Sherman reported that he had, without consulting Washington, reached an armistice agreement with Confederate General Joseph Johnston for the surrender of in North Carolina in exchange for the existing government remaining in power. Slaves would remain in chains. Johnson refused to accept this and sent word to Sherman to secure the surrender with no deals in politics. He also placed a bounty of $100,000 on Jefferson Davis which gave him a reputation for being tough on the South.
Lee, now safe in Richmond, again publicly spurned any temptation for guerilla warfare and called for all Southerners to become Americans. The generals chose to follow Lee’s example and not their Confederate commander-in-chief. By the end of April, the war was over.
Those who yearn for an America where we merely let the South secede in 1861 or demand amore strict returns would do well to remember that neither case would have been peaceful for the country. It is impossible to picture a two state solution for the continent where the rest of our history would involve anything but constant internecine warfare.
This also leaves out the critical fact that since the majority of African Americans were in the South, we would have a nation that was still half-slave and half-free. The slavery question would have just continued in one part of the country and very well might have continued to this day. Does anyone truly believe that the South would have been inclined to let their property escape to a foreign nation — which is what the North would have been — and it would not have led to greater and more constant conflict?
There would have been no peace if the South had just gone — and the ‘Negro problem’ would have been ignored in the North for the rest of our history. Why should they? Slavery was a Southern institution and few had listened to abolitionists before the war. Even during the war the idea of abolition was repugnant to the Democrats that still remained and even the existing Republican party was divided over it. Those who feel America’s problems of today would be resolved if we’d just let the South go are guilty of, at best, willful blindness.
And to that the nation does owe a debt to both Johnson and Lee. The nation very well could have, rather than be united, end up becoming the Balkans, the Middle East — or Vietnam. The actions of Lee in calling for peace instead of guerilla warfare and Johnson decided to accept the spirit of Appomattox rather then the calls for bloodshed are something that nation has decided to given the credit for doing.
But then Johnson did squander the opportunity he’d been given. However, it’s worth remembering that was not entirely his fault, even though he does deserve much of the blame. In the next article I will deal with the flaws in Lincoln’s history tends to ignore and the major figures among the Radical Republicans who were critical to Johnson’s downfall.